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INTRODUCTION: WELFARE STATES AND IN-WORK
POVERTY
Until recently, scholars argued that different welfare state regimes create
different kinds of poverty. The typical face of poverty in liberal welfare
states such as the USA is that of the working poor. The relatively
large number of working poor in the USA is a consequence of the central
characteristics of a liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The
combination of marginal social protection and low minimum wages creates
a situation in which vulnerable people are often forced to work but
remain poor (Jencks, 2005; Neubeck, 2006). On the other hand, because of
the low wage levels in the USA, there is ample low-skilled and low-paid
work available for those people who depend on this segment of the
labour market. Such jobs are often lacking in the more developed welfare
states of the European continent. As a result, there are many US citizens
who work but are nevertheless poor. Moreover, working poor individuals
often have to combine several low-paid jobs in order to make ends meet –
a situation that has been vividly described in ethnographic studies about the
American working poor (Ehrenreich, 2002; Newman, 1999; Venkatesh,
2006).
The typical face of poverty in the European welfare states – especially
those on the European continent – is rather different. Continental
European or ‘corporatist’ welfare states tend to become ‘welfare states
without work’ (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Because of the higher levels of
social security in these countries – mostly in the form of a social safety net
for all citizens – those who do not work or are unable to work can gener-
ally rely on social security or means-tested social assistance. The relatively
high legal minimum wages in the Continental European welfare states
124
M1442 - ANDREß TEXT.qxd  29/5/08  1:08 pm  Page 124 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S
protect the working population but also make labour relatively expensive.
As a consequence, low-skilled labour becomes unprofitable and tends to be
excluded from the formal labour market. In short, the Continental
European welfare states have high levels of social security but tend to
exclude vulnerable groups – especially low-skilled workers – from the
labour market. The corresponding typical face of poverty in countries like
the Netherlands is (or was) that of ‘persistent state dependency’: the Dutch
poor mostly did not work, but lived on social benefits (Engbersen, 1995;
Engbersen et al., 2006).
The risk of this kind of comparison of welfare state regimes (liberal
versus conservative welfare states), however, is that they tend to be static
and often overlook institutional changes within separate countries. Indeed,
Esping-Andersen insists that the characteristics of welfare state regimes are
so much anchored in historical institutions that fundamental changes are
hardly thinkable (the axiom of ‘path dependency’ or ‘institutional immo-
bility’; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Pierson, 1994; 2000).1 Others point out
fundamental changes that have taken place in contemporary welfare states.
In the case of the Netherlands, Visser and Hemerijck (1996) argued that
small reforms in labour conditions, monetary policies and social security
have resulted in significant changes in social security: less social protection,
less generous social benefits and more ‘activating’ labour market policies
(cf. Hemerijck and Visser, 2006). Gilbert (2002) observed a transformation
of the welfare states in both the USA and Europe, from the traditional
welfare state to an ‘enabling state’. Universal and unconditional social
security systems that offered protection from the social risks of the free
labour market (‘decommodification’) were typical for the ‘old’ welfare state.
The new enabling state, on the other hand, emphasizes the promotion of
work rather than social protection. The central aim of the enabling state
is to prevent social exclusion and to stimulate citizens to work (= ‘social
inclusion’). Social security contains financial incentives and sanctions that
stimulate benefit claimants to return to the labour market. Universal
and unconditional social benefits are gradually replaced by selective
arrangements for a more restricted group of households that are really
unable to provide for their own incomes through formal work (Gilbert,
2002: 43–7).
Gilbert’s argument is not that US and European welfare states are con-
verging, but rather that they are developing in a similar direction: less social
protection and more emphasis on ‘activating’ measures and promotion of
work. Such institutional reforms are visible in the Netherlands as well. As
early as the late 1980s – at the height of the economic crisis – social benefits
were actually reduced (by an average of 10 per cent) and subsequently
frozen for many years. The problem, however, as it was then perceived, was
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excessive dependence on disability benefits (often referred to as the ‘Dutch
disease’). In 1987, a drastic revision of the Dutch Disability Insurance Act
(Dutch acronym WAO) was issued, the first of a whole series of revisions
in the WAO, which ended in 2006 with the repeal of the WAO and the intro-
duction of a new act: Work and Income According to Labour Capacity.
The name of this new act clearly shows its intention: people with health
limitations are expected to work and earn their own income as far as their
health enables them to do so. Partial disability benefits are only possible
when people still work. This drastic policy change began in the mid-1980s
with the removal of the measure stipulating that people with partial health
limitations could receive a full disability benefit. Another drastic policy
change which was initiated during those years was the gradual reduction of
the duration of unemployment benefits. All these changes were intended to
reduce persistent benefit dependence and to stimulate the resumption of
work. However, in the early 1990s, it became clear that the welfare state
reforms had thus far failed to achieve this objective. A new round of even
more drastic adjustments to the Dutch social security system followed.
These new policy interventions were inspired by a new definition of the
problem. The problem of the Dutch welfare state was not only a financial
one – the burden of many and persistent social benefits – but one of uncon-
trollability. The new social security reforms of the 1990s were therefore pri-
marily aimed at influencing the behaviour of social benefit claimants, social
security institutions and all the societal organizations surrounding the
Dutch social security system. Van der Veen (1999) describes the new social
security reforms of the 1990s as the transition from a social right paradigm
to an incentive paradigm.
The successive changes in the Dutch social security and social assistance
systems in the 1990s are too numerous to describe extensively here (see
Aarts et al., 2002; Teulings et al., 1997; Van der Veen, 1999; Visser and
Hemerijck, 1996). However, we can give some examples:
● Disentanglement of the implementation of social security. Interest
groups such as employers and trade unions were disconnected from
the social security system because they were held responsible for the
enormous increase in social security dependence that occurred in the
late 1980s.
● Privatization of risks. The risks of illness, incapacity and unemploy-
ment were ‘returned’ to employers – first by the differentiation of
employer contributions (in case of incapacity or unemployment),
and later by repealing all collective social protection for ill employ-
ees. Employers are now obliged to pay wages to sick employees
during the first year (later the first two years) of their illness. The idea
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was that employers would be more active in stimulating sick employ-
ees to resume work if they themselves were responsible for the
employees’ wages during the period of illness.
● Further reduction of the level and duration of benefits. During the
1990s, the level of disability and unemployment benefits was reduced
further – from 80 down to 70 per cent of the claimant’s former
income. The duration of unemployment benefits is continuously
being reduced. There is still no time limit on disability and social
assistance benefits, although there is more pressure on benefit
claimants to resume work.
● More selective access to social benefits. By using stricter criteria, the
influx of employees with minor health limitations being covered
under the Disablement Insurance Act was reduced. Under the new
Work and Income According to Labour Capacities Act, partially
incapacitated persons are denied access to the disability scheme alto-
gether. They can receive income support only when they work. If not,
they have to rely on (means tested) social assistance. Another
example of more selective access to social security was when the right
of social assistance for young people was replaced during the 1990s
by the obligation to work (the so-called Juvenile Work Guarantee
Scheme).
● More conditional social benefits. Unconditional social rights were
gradually replaced by more conditional benefits – specifically, the
condition to find work. A first example is widow’s pensions: widows
(of working age) are now obliged to find employment. Successive
reforms of the Dutch Social Assistance Act, in particular, implied
stricter requirements for single parents to find new employment. In
the 1980s, single parents with children under 18 years of age were
not obliged to work. Since 1996, however, only single parents with
children under 5 have been exempted from labour market participa-
tion. With the new Work and Social Assistance Act, any single
parent – irrespective of the child’s age – is obliged to work (or at least
to look for work or improve his or her labour market chances
through education). Employees with minor health limitations and
social assistance claimants in general were also confronted with
stricter regulations aimed at promoting work (for instance, the use
of financial sanctions or interruption of benefits).
● ‘Activating’ labour market policies. Whereas in the 1980s, the
Netherlands was heavily criticized for its markedly passive labour
market policies, which created massive and persistent unemploy-
ment (Therborn, 1986), during the 1990s there was a fundamental
change in the direction of ‘activating’ labour market approaches. In
The silent transformation of the Dutch welfare state 127
M1442 - ANDREß TEXT.qxd  29/5/08  1:08 pm  Page 127 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S
particular, the cabinets of Social Democrats and Liberals (the so-
called ‘purple coalition’) that ruled the Netherlands during the
second half of the 1990s heavily emphasized work resumption (the
cabinet’s motto was ‘Work, work, work’). One instrument for pro-
moting work was extensive subsidized work programmes, which pro-
vided thousands of (often persistently) unemployed people with
low-paid ‘additional’ employment.
In our view, the successive reforms that have taken place in the Dutch
social security system from the mid-1980s until now have resulted in a silent
transformation of the Dutch welfare state. Many of the reforms described
above were implemented by the cabinet of Social Democrats and Liberals
that was in power from 1994 until 2002. The Conservative cabinet that fol-
lowed radicalized the social security reforms even further by issuing the new
social assistance and disability acts that we already mentioned. However,
these new reforms, which took place after 2002, are not included in our
empirical analysis, since our empirical data only cover the period from
1985–2001.
Our main argument in this chapter is that the institutional reforms in the
Dutch social security system that have been implemented since the late
1980s have implied a fundamental change in the nature of income poverty
in the Netherlands. Until then, poor people in the Netherlands were pre-
dominantly (persistent) social benefit claimants. We will argue that the
described social security reforms in the Netherlands – especially the stricter
regulations to promote resumption of work by single mothers, employees
with minor health limitations, and long-term unemployed persons in
general – resulted in an increase in in-work poverty. As a result of the more
selective and activating social security system that developed during the
1990s, social benefit claimants were pushed into the labour market. Labour
market participation, however, does not necessarily imply an escape from
financial poverty. In particular, (former) benefit claimants with weak
labour market positions (in terms of employment or household character-
istics) tend to remain poor even though they participate in the labour
market. Our main hypothesis, therefore, is that the expected increase in in-
work poverty is a consequence of the fact that people with weak labour
market positions (low-skilled or part-time workers, people working in pre-
carious service jobs, singles or single parents living in one-earner house-
holds) are being pushed from the social security system into the labour
market.
However, we should also consider the possibility that the (expected) rise
in in-work poverty in the Netherlands is not related to institutional
reforms in the Dutch welfare state and social security system. The increase
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in in-work poverty in the Netherlands could also stem from the more
general economic and demographic developments that took place in the
Netherlands in the (late) 1990s – such as an increase in low-paid work, part-
time work, insecure low-paid service jobs, self-employment, increased
female labour market participation, or an increasing number of singles,
single parents and, more generally, of one-earner households.
This chapter analyses the development of in-work poverty in the
Netherlands over the period from 1985–2001 by using statistical data from
the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. Our research questions are threefold
(1) How did in-work poverty in the Netherlands develop during this period?
(2) Who are the working poor in the Netherlands? (3) How can we explain
the increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands? The next section of this
chapter outlines the empirical data and methodologies used in our analy-
sis. The third section describes the development of in-work poverty in the
Netherlands. The fourth examines the composition of the Dutch working
poor population, in terms of their labour market characteristics, and their
individual and household characteristics. In the fifth section we discuss our
findings and our central hypothesis that the rise of in-work poverty in the
Netherlands is directly related to the institutional reforms of the Dutch
social security system in the last decades.
DATA AND METHODS
Database
The data used in our analyses are taken from the Dutch Socio-Economic
Panel (DSEP), which existed from 1984 to 2002. Here we use the data from
19852 until 2001. In the first year DSEP still contained a limited number of
respondents, making its data less reliable. In 2002, there was a major change
in the method of income measurement. Unlike all previous years, infor-
mation about household incomes was not derived from the survey, but
directly from administrative data. Since this significantly influenced the
outcomes, we decided not to use 2002 data in our analyses. The DSEP is
an annual survey among 5000 households (around 10 000 adult individu-
als) and gives a consistent description of the socio-economic situation of
households and individuals and – as a panel study – of changes in this
situation.
Here, we make particular use of the data about household incomes and
various background characteristics of the households and individuals
involved. However, using statistical data collected over such a long period
almost inevitably implies that the methods of data collection change over
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the years. From 1984 through to 1989, the survey was held twice a year and
asked for the current monthly income of households. These monthly
incomes were then converted to annual incomes. From 1990 onward, the
DSEP became an annual survey and asked (among many other things) for
the household income in the previous year.
As a consequence, the DSEP now contains two different figures based on
income data that were collected in 1989 (in the 1989 wave based on monthly
incomes in that year and in the 1990 wave based on annual incomes in the
previous year). Although this is not completely unproblematic, we decided
not to change this situation – for instance, by regarding the 1990 wave as
the 1989 wave (that is, the year the income data refer to, and so on for all
following years). There were basically two reasons for this. First, all the
other variables used in the analysis (including household composition
and even some income components) refer to the year the survey was
held. Second, we do not want to remove ourselves from the community
of researchers using the DSEP and their customary way of interpreting
DSEP data. However, the reader should keep in mind that our income
data for the years after 1989 actually refer to the household income in the
previous year.
Definitions and Measurements
Being poor is defined here as living in a poor household. To establish
whether or not a household is poor, we use the poverty threshold that is
widely accepted in international comparative poverty research. A house-
hold is considered to be poor when its equivalized disposable household
income3 is less than 60 per cent of the median disposable income of all
households in that year. In our analyses, we used the standard variable
‘equivalized disposable household income’ in DSEP. The equivalence
factors used in DSEP differ from those used in other research – namely,
1 for the first adult in the household, 0.38 for each additional adult, and
0.15–0.30 for underage children, depending on their age and position in the
household.
The population used in our analyses is adults of working age (15–64
years of age), with the exception of two specific categories. The first of these
are households with negative disposable incomes (which appear frequently
among self-employed persons). Second, and consistent with most Dutch
poverty research, students were also excluded from the analyses. The reason
for doing so is that when we only consider the (mostly low) incomes of
students they will generally be considered as ‘poor’ (and when they have a
small job, they will be considered as working poor). However, we do not
consider students to be poor because they are aware that being a student
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involves having a low income and choose this position in order to obtain
much higher incomes later in their careers. In our perception, including
both negative household incomes and students would result in an overesti-
mation of the magnitude of poverty in a country. In our analyses, ‘working’
is defined as working at least one hour a week.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN-WORK POVERTY IN
THE NETHERLANDS (1985–2001)
This section describes the development of poverty and in-work poverty in
the Netherlands from the mid-1980s until 2001. During these years, as we
already mentioned, the Dutch economy was characterized by two major
periods. In the late 1980s, the Netherlands faced a severe economic crisis
and a large and persistent unemployment rate. The 1990s – particularly the
second half of the 1990s – brought an economic recovery, economic pros-
perity and constant job growth. In the international literature, this
period in Dutch economic history became known as the ‘Dutch miracle’
(Visser and Hemerijck, 1996). One crucial feature of the booming economy
during these years was the strong increase in labour market participation.
The number of employed persons (working at least 12 hours a week)
increased from around 5.5 million in 1990 to 7 million in 2001; an increase
of 25 per cent in only 12 years (see Table 5.A1 in the Appendix). Here we
will describe what these changes in the economic tide implied for the devel-
opment of income poverty – particularly of in-work poverty – in the
Netherlands.
Figure 5.1 shows the development of the total poverty population (indi-
viduals between 15 and 64 years of age) in the Netherlands from 1985 to
2001. The figure shows that the size of the Dutch poverty population in the
1990s was considerably larger than in the 1980s. However, we should add
that this outcome is strongly influenced by the relative poverty measure-
ment (60 per cent of the annual median income) used in our analysis.4 More
importantly, since our focus is on the development of in-work poverty,
Figure 5.1 shows a gradual shift within the Dutch poverty population from
non-working poor to working poor (see also Table 5.A2 in the Appendix).
In the mid-1980s, less than 3 per cent of all Dutch individuals of working
age were poor and working. In 1990, 4.3 per cent of the Dutch population
of working age belonged to the working poor. In 2001, the last year under
examination, this figure had increased to 6 per cent. At the same time, the
share of the non-working poor (as a percentage of the total population of
working age) remained constant (it fluctuated between 4 and 6 per cent with
no discernible trend). As a result of both tendencies, the ratio between the
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two categories changed. Up until the mid-1990s, the majority of the Dutch
poverty population of working age (15–64 years, students not included!)
was not working. However, since the late 1990s, there has been a significant
shift in the Dutch poverty population. Beginning in 1998, the majority of
the Dutch poverty population was actually working. In 2001, not less than
57 per cent of all adult members of poor Dutch households were working.
Although more recent empirical data are not available, we expect that
number of working-poor individuals in the Netherlands will have increased
further after 2001, because the transformation of the Dutch welfare state
(less social protection, more emphasis on work promotion) was even more
pronounced after that.
The conclusion can be that the economic boom and constant job growth
that occurred in the Netherlands in the late 1990s went hand in hand with
an increase in in-work poverty and a shift in the Dutch poverty population
(from non-working to working poor). However, the increase in in-work
poverty may just be the result of strongly increased labour market partici-
pation during these years. After all, with more people at work – as was the
case in the Netherlands during this period – the number of working poor
automatically increases even when the poverty risk for working people
remains constant. If this is the case, the increase in in-work poverty in the
Netherlands can simply be attributed to economic developments – espe-
cially to increased labour market participation during those years. But as
Figure 5.2 makes clear, this is only one part of the story, because the
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Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.1 Working and non-working poor persons in the Netherlands 
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poverty risk of employed persons (or the in-work poverty rate) also
increased from a level of less that 4 per cent in the late 1980s to between
5 and 6 per cent from the early to mid-1990s, and to at least 7 per cent since
1998. The latter figure implies that one in every 14 working individuals in
the Netherlands lives in a poor household. We can also conclude that the
poverty risk for working people in the Netherlands almost doubled
between the late 1980s and 2001 (and may have increased even further after
that). Figure 5.2 also shows that the poverty risk for non-working people is
significantly higher than that of working people and has also increased
in the last decades; but this does not negate the fact that there has also
been a significant increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands since the
mid-1990s.
To summarize our findings thus far, we can say that since the mid-1990s –
that is, in a period that saw a booming economy, strongly increased labour
market participation, and institutional reforms in the Dutch social security
system – there has been a significant shift in the Dutch poverty population.
Whereas until the mid-1990s, the majority of the Dutch poverty popula-
tion was not working, since 1998 at least half (up to almost 60 per cent in
2001) of the Dutch poverty population was working. In our percep-
tion, these figures reveal a significant change in the character of the Dutch
welfare state and social security system. Until recently, the typical face of
poverty in the Netherlands was that of the non-working poor living off
social benefits. Since the mid-1990s, a new face of poverty has arisen in
The silent transformation of the Dutch welfare state 133
Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.2 Poverty risks of working and non-working persons in the
Netherlands (%)
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the Netherlands: individuals who are working – partly because they have
been pushed from social security or social assistance back into the
labour market – but are nevertheless poor. Furthermore, we have estab-
lished that this increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands is not only
the result of increased labour market participation during those years
(which, when the in-work poverty risk for working people remains con-
stant, automatically results in more in-work poverty). In addition, working
people now face a greater risk of income poverty – up to a point where
shortly after the turn of the millennium, one in every 14 working adults
(students not included) lived in a poor household. Although we do not have
more recent empirical data, this number may have increased even further in
recent years.
WHO ARE THE WORKING POOR?
Who are the working poor? This section of the chapter describes the main
labour market (employed versus self-employed individuals, working hours,
occupational class), individual and household characteristics (gender, age,
household composition and number of incomes in the household, educa-
tional levels) of the working poor in the Netherlands. We also analyse to
what extent these labour market, individual and household characteristics
of the working poor have changed in recent decades.
Labour Market Characteristics
As international research shows, self-employed persons experience a higher
in-work poverty risk than employees (Bardone and Guio, 2005). An alter-
native explanation for the rise of in-work poverty in the Netherlands in the
1990s may therefore be that the number of self-employed persons living
below the poverty threshold increased. However, Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b)
do not support this assumption. Although Figure 5.3(b) shows that self-
employed persons in the Netherlands have a higher poverty risk than
employees, the figure also makes clear that the poverty risks of both cate-
gories tend to converge. Whereas the poverty risk of the self-employed has
tended to decline, the poverty risk of employees increased in recent decades
(from little more than 2 per cent in the mid-1980s to around 7 per cent in
the last three years under examination). Although self-employed persons
are still over-represented in the Dutch in-work poverty population, this
over-representation has been on the decline. As a result, as Figure 5.3(a)
shows, the self-employed are a declining, not a growing share of the Dutch
in-work poverty population.
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Another issue is part-time work. The Netherlands has experienced a
strong increase in part-time work in recent decades, especially because of
the huge influx of women into the labour force and the fact that many
female Dutch workers work part-time (Visser, 2002). The so-called
‘1.5 breadwinner model’ (the man works full-time, the wife works part-
time) has become more or less the standard in the Netherlands. One
could assume that the increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands
is the result of the large increase among women working in part-time
jobs – especially because in our analysis, anyone who works at least one
hour a week is defined as ‘working’.5 On the other hand, part-time work
is not necessarily related to in-work poverty. Part-time workers (or low-
paid workers in general) living in households with more than one
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Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.3 Employment, self-employment and in-work poverty
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income have the possibility of pooling multiple incomes and are often
not poor.
As Figure 5.4(a) shows, the increase in in-work poverty in the
Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s was not the result of an
increase in part-time work. In all years, full-time workers (people working
at least four days a week) were the largest subcategory among the working
poor. Between 1985 and 1993, the share of full-time workers among the
working poor was quite constant (it declined with some fluctuations, from
55 to 53 per cent). In the following years, the share of full-time workers
among the working poor fell further, to 45 per cent in 2001. Nevertheless,
full-time workers are still the largest subcategory among the working poor.
Figure 5.4(b) makes clear that the risk of in-work poverty is obviously
related to the number of working hours. People working in small part-time
jobs (less than 20 hours a week) have a larger poverty risk than people
working in more significant part-time or full-time jobs (more than
20 hours). In particular, the in-work poverty risk for people working
between 12 and 19 hours a week has exploded since the mid-1990s (from
almost 6 per cent in 1994 to 14 per cent in 2001). However, the share of this
subcategory among the working poor is too small to explain the overall
increase in the in-work poverty risk in the Netherlands in the late 1990s.
The fact that in-work poverty appears to be unrelated to part-time work
is not really surprising. Many part-time workers – especially those with
small part-time jobs – are women from non-poor households who earn
some income in addition to their spouses’ earnings. These households are
not poor, and the extra incomes from the wives’ part-time jobs make them
even less poor. However, we can assume that part-time work is strongly
related to in-work poverty when there is only one income earner in the
household (see Figure 5.9(a) and (b)).
A final labour market characteristic that is relevant in relation to in-work
poverty is occupational class. It has been argued that structural changes in
Western economies – in short, the shift from industrial to post-industrial
employment – have also resulted in the rise of precarious and often low-
paid service jobs. Esping-Andersen (1993: 25) even mentioned the rise of
what he called the new ‘post-industrial service proletariat’. These precari-
ous new service jobs are concentrated in urban economies and are often
filled by women, immigrants, and other population categories with weak
labour market positions (Sassen, 1991; Snel et al., 2007). The increase in
precarious, low-skilled service work may be another possible explanation
for the increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands. We measured the
occupational class of the working poor using the class scheme developed
by Esping-Andersen (1993). What is crucial to this approach is that he dis-
tinguishes two separate occupational hierarchies: the Fordist hierarchy
136 Country chapters
M1442 - ANDREß TEXT.qxd  29/5/08  1:08 pm  Page 136 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S
(ranging from managers, clerical and sales occupations to skilled and
unskilled manual workers) and the post-industrial hierarchy (ranging from
professionals, technicians and semi-professionals to skilled and unskilled
service workers). Here, we ‘collapsed’ Esping-Andersen’s class scheme into
four basic categories: Fordist high, post-industrial high, Fordist low, and
post-industrial low occupations. The latter two categories consist of skilled
and unskilled manual or service workers.6
If the increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands was indeed the result
of an increase in precarious, low-skilled service work, we would expect this
subcategory of the occupational structure to (a) account for a significant
and increasing share of the Dutch in-work poverty population, and (b) have
high and increasing in-work poverty risks. However, neither appears to be
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Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.4 Part-time work and in-work poverty
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the case. In 2001, for instance, skilled or unskilled manual workers (‘Fordist
low’) formed a larger share of the Dutch working poor than skilled and
unskilled service workers (‘post-industrial low’; 30 versus 26 per cent). The
relatively high share of persons working in managerial, clerical and sales
occupations (25 per cent) among the working poor is also remarkable.
Moreover, almost half of the Dutch working poor are persons working in
higher Fordist or higher post-industrial occupations. As Figure 5.5(b)
shows, the in-work poverty risks are indeed highest in the lower post-indus-
trial occupations, but they are only marginally different from the in-work
poverty risks in the low-skilled Fordist occupations. Moreover, the poverty
risks of low-skilled service workers are not increasing. Overall, changes in
the occupational class structure (especially the rise of precarious service
jobs) do not explain the increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands.
More generally, we can say that the labour market characteristics dis-
cussed thus far reveal little about the causes for the increase in in-work
poverty in the Netherlands. This is less surprising than it seems to be at first
glance. Increases in self-employment, part-time work and the number of
low-qualified service jobs may result in an increase in the number of low-
paid workers. However, having a low (individual) income is not the same as
poverty, because poverty is measured at the household level. When people
with low earnings live in non-poor households and can pool their own
small incomes with those of their spouses, they are not necessarily poor. In
other words, the individual and household characteristics of the working
poor may be more significant than their labour market characteristics.
Individual and Household Characteristics
In this section, we will describe four individual and household characteris-
tics of the working poor: gender, household type, number of incomes in the
household and educational level. We will start with in-work poverty and
gender. One of the most important socio-economic developments in the
Netherlands in recent decades has been the strong increase in female labour
market participation. The female employment rate (that is, the number of
employed women in relation to all women of working age) increased from
30 per cent in 1985 to 54 per cent in 2001 (see Table 5.A1 in the Appendix).
More female labour market participation can contribute to in-work
poverty when the new female labour market participants are over-repre-
sented in low-paid, precarious and part-time jobs. As we mentioned before,
many Dutch women do indeed work in part-time jobs. However, part-time
and low-paid work contributes to in-work poverty primarily when there is
no possibility of pooling various incomes within the household; that is, in
single-earner households.
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As Figure 5.6(a) reveals, in-work poverty in the Netherlands is, to a large
extent and increasingly, a female issue. This is a surprising outcome
insofar as earlier research showed that in-work poverty in most European
countries is predominantly a male phenomenon. The reason is that low-
paid male workers are often single earners (the traditional breadwin-
ner), whereas many low-paid female workers do not live in poor
households (Bardone and Guio, 2005). However, this is different in the
Netherlands. Since the early 1990s, at least 60 per cent of the Dutch
working poor are women. Moreover, since the early 1990s, the in-work
poverty risk for women has also been at least twice as high as it is for men
(Figure 5.6(b)).
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Figure 5.5 Social class and in-work poverty
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For the time being, we may conclude that the increase in in-work poverty
in the Netherlands indeed seems to be related to the increase in female
labour market participation. Not only do more women work (and thus have
a chance of becoming working poor) but, more importantly, the in-work
poverty risk for women also increased during the 1990s (Figure 5.6(b)).
Both tendencies contribute to the increase in in-work poverty in the
Netherlands. Later we will find, however, that gender has no direct
influence on a person’s odds of in-work poverty.
Another important factor is the household situation of the workers. As
we argued before, low wages and part-time work only result in more in-
work poverty in the case of singles and single parents who do not have the
possibility of pooling various incomes within their households. Figures
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Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.6 Gender and in-work poverty
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5.7(a) and (b) show the household composition of the working poor and
the in-work poverty risks of various household categories. As Figure 5.7(a)
shows, couples with children are still by far the largest subcategory among
the working poor, although this category has shrunk over the years. The
shares of singles and single-parent families among the working poor, on the
other hand, have increased over the years, although all figures fluctuate
heavily each year. In the late 1990s, one in three or four working poor indi-
viduals was either single or single parent. Moreover, as Figure 5.7(b) shows,
the in-work poverty risk for single parents jumped higher in recent years
(especially after 1996). Single parents were also an important category
at risk of poverty in the 1980s and early 1990s, but then they were
mostly not working. In recent years, more and more single parents do
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Figure 5.7 Household composition and in-work poverty
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work – undoubtedly because of stricter social security regulations con-
cerning this category – but are still poor. Because of the need to combine
work and caregiving, single parents can often work only part-time. For
single parents, working part-time for a low wage almost automatically
results in in-work poverty because almost by definition, they fail to have the
possibility of pooling multiple incomes in one household. As a result of all
this, one in three or four single parents in the late 1990s were working but
nevertheless poor.
All of our outcomes thus far point more or less in the same direction.
The crucial factor in explaining the rise of in-work poverty in the
Netherlands is not so much the increases in self-employment or part-time
work or the growing number of workers (particularly women) in low-
qualified service jobs as such, but rather the fact that working people with
weak labour market positions live in households without other adults with
whom they can pool their incomes. To test whether this is true, we analysed
the relationship of in-work poverty to the number of income earners in a
household. The outcomes support our expectation that in-work poverty is
strongly concentrated in single earner households – either families with a
traditional (mostly male) single breadwinner or households of singles and
single parents. As Figure 5.8(a) shows, the large majority (up to 80 per cent
in 1999) of the Dutch working poor live in households with only one
income earner. However, this is not something new. Single-earner house-
holds made up the large majority of the working poor in all the years under
examination (1985–2001). Figure 5.8(b) shows, however, that the in-work
poverty risk for single-earner households increased considerably during the
1990s (from 12 per cent in 1990 to 19.4 per cent in 2001). In other words,
almost one in five working adults in single earner households is poor!
In our view, this development is directly related to the institutional
reforms in the Dutch social security system described earlier in this chapter.
Single earners are often working individuals with marked weak labour
positions. This applies both to traditional male breadwinners (often immi-
grants) and to modern single-earner households (singles, single parents). In
the 1980s and early 1990s, it was usually accepted that these individuals,
who had few prospects on the formal labour market, lived off of social secu-
rity. Beginning in the mid-1990s, many of these individuals with weak
labour market positions were pushed into the labour market. But given
their insufficient qualifications, they were unable to escape from poverty. As
a result, they now work but are nevertheless poor.
A final individual characteristic covered in our analysis is the educa-
tional level of the working poor. For several reasons, we assumed that in-
work poverty was strongly related to low-skilled work. First, given the shift
from Fordist to post-industrial work, we expected to see an increase in in-
142 Country chapters
M1442 - ANDREß TEXT.qxd  29/5/08  1:08 pm  Page 142 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S
work poverty because low-skilled work is less protected in the service indus-
tries than in the highly unionized industrial sector. Second, because of the
institutional changes in the Dutch social security system, working people
with weak labour market qualifications are less sheltered by social security
and more often obliged to participate in the labour market – even when
their income-earning capacities are limited. However, as becomes clear
from Figure 5.9(a), a surprisingly large number of working poor individu-
als have at least an intermediate educational level (up to 66 per cent in
2001). We can thus conclude that in-work poverty in the Netherlands is cer-
tainly not restricted to the least educated workers.
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Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.8 Number of income earners in the household and in-work
poverty
(a) Percentage of all working poor 
(b) Poverty risk (%) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
One earner Two earners 3 or more earners
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
One earner Two earners 3 or more earners
20011985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
20011985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
M1442 - ANDREß TEXT.qxd  29/5/08  1:08 pm  Page 143 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S
On the other hand, as Figure 5.9(b) shows, the in-work-poverty risks of
low-educated workers (with only an elementary education) are significantly
higher than the in-work poverty risks of all other categories. Moreover, the
in-work-poverty risks of low-educated workers more than doubled between
1990 and 2001 (from 8.7 per cent to 20.5 per cent). The in-work poverty
risks of workers with lower vocational or general educations also increased,
albeit to a lesser extent.
Multivariate Analysis
Our description thus far has shown that self-employed persons, people
working in part-time jobs and low-skilled service jobs, women, singles,
144 Country chapters
Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
Figure 5.9 Educational levels and in-work poverty
(a) Percentage of all working poor 
(b) Poverty risk (%) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Only elementary Lower vocational and general Intermediate Higher
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
Only elementary Lower vocational and general Intermediate Higher
20011985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
20011985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
M1442 - ANDREß TEXT.qxd  29/5/08  1:08 pm  Page 144 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S
single parents – and one-earner households in general – and low-educated
workers are over-represented among the working poor. However, these are
strongly overlapping categories. For instance, women can be over-
represented among the working poor because they work in part-time jobs
more often. The multivariate analysis (logistic regression) in Table 5.1
shows what factors make a difference for a person’s odds of in-work poverty
and what factors do not. We used the data from the last cross-section (2001)
and included all variables discussed thus far in the model, plus two addi-
tional variables (age and number of children in the household). The most
interesting finding in Table 5.1 is that gender as such does not make a
difference. Taking all other factors into account, women do not belong to
the working poor more often than men do. Nor does the number of chil-
dren in a household make a difference. All other factors show significant
effects on the odds of in-work poverty.
Table 5.1 starts with the labour market characteristics discussed before.
The odds of in-work poverty are around 2.5 (=1/0.397) times higher for
self-employed individuals than they are for employees. Working hours also
make a great difference. People with small part-time jobs (up to 20 hours a
week) have an almost four times greater chance of experiencing in-work
poverty than full-time workers (at least 32 hours a week). But even more
significant, part-time jobs (20–31 hours a week) greatly increase people’s
odds of in-work poverty. Our expectation that working in lower service jobs
increases the odds of in-work poverty appears to be wrong: the in-work
poverty risk of workers in lower Fordist jobs is not significantly different.
The odds of in-work poverty for individuals working in higher Fordist or
post-industrial jobs are less than half of those for the low-Fordist reference
category.
Household characteristics also make a significant difference for a
person’s odds of in-work poverty. Single parents belong to the working
poor almost twice as often as the reference category of couples with chil-
dren. This is what we expected; however, single persons belong to the
working poor much less often than the reference category of couples with
children. The most important factor, however, is the number of income
earners in the household. The odds of in-work poverty for households with
two or more income earners are less than 10 per cent of those for house-
holds with only one adult income earner. Educational level also makes a
huge difference: in-work poverty appears to be heavily concentrated
within the group of workers with the lowest educational level (only ele-
mentary education). Having a lower vocational or general education
decreases the odds of in-work poverty by more than 50 per cent (com-
pared with the reference category of workers with only elementary
education). The odds of in-work poverty for people with a higher
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vocational or university education are only one-fifth of those for the refer-
ence category of workers with the lowest educational level. Finally, age also
makes a difference. The effect of age is negative: the in-work poverty risk is
higher for younger persons.
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Table 5.1 In-work poverty risks in the Netherlands (2001) (logistic
regression coefficients, standard errors, p values, odds ratios)
Variable coef. s.e. p odds ratio
Constant 3.708 0.570 0.000 40.760
Labour market characteristics
Employment status (Ref: self-employed)
Employed 0.924 0.274 0.001 0.397
Working hours (Ref  32 hours)
Small part-time ( 12 hours) 1.344 0.322 0.000 3.833
Middle part-time (12–19 hours) 1.384 0.271 0.000 3.992
Large part-time (20–31 hours) 0.894 0.195 0.000 2.446
Occupational class (Ref: Fordist low)
Post-industrial low 0.115 0.218 0.597 0.891
Fordist high 0.787 0.211 0.000 0.455
Post-industrial high 0.821 0.240 0.001 0.440
Individual and household characteristics
Gender (Ref: male)
Female 0.179 0.187 0.338 1.196
Household situation (Ref: couple with kids)
Couple without kid(s) 0.412 0.311 0.186 0.663
Single adult 0.828 0.312 0.008 0.437
Single parent 0.598 0.273 0.029 1.818
Number of income earners (Ref: one earner)
Two income earners 2.708 0.189 0.000 0.067
Three or more income earners 3.866 0.373 0.000 0.021
Educational level (Ref: only elementary)
Lower general or occupational 0.876 0.307 0.004 0.416
Middle general or occupational 1.074 0.279 0.000 0.342
Higher occupational 1.738 0.344 0.000 0.176
University 1.487 0.413 0.000 0.226
Number of children 0.119 0.118 0.315 1.126
Age 0.080 0.008 0.000 0.923
N 4039
2 Log likelihood 1382.931
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.332
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 2001.
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DISCUSSION
In this study, we showed that the major economic boom and constant job
growth in the Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s (the so-called
‘Dutch Miracle’) went hand in hand with an increase in in-work poverty.
Between 1990 and 2001 – at the height of the economic boom – the in-work
poverty risk increased from 6.6 to 7.7 per cent. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
the majority of all poor adults of working age (15–64 years) were not
working. Ever since 1998, more than half – up to 57 per cent in 2001 – of
the Dutch poverty population in the working age was actually working. In
this chapter, we argued that the rise of in-work poverty in the Netherlands
is partly the natural result of increased labour market participation during
those years (leading to more in-work poverty even when working people’s
odds of being poor remain constant). However, this is only part of the
story. In addition, working people in the Netherlands now face a greater
risk of income poverty, up to a point where one in 14 working adults (stu-
dents with odd jobs not included) live in poor households. In our percep-
tion, these figures reveal a significant change in the character of the Dutch
welfare state. Until recently, the typical face of poverty in the Netherlands
was that of the non-working poor living off social benefits. Since the mid-
1990s, a new face of poverty has emerged: individuals who are working –
partly because they were pushed from social security or social assistance
back into the labour market – but are nevertheless poor. In-work poverty is
no longer typical only for liberal welfare states such as the USA, but has
become ‘normal’ in the Netherlands as well.
Our main hypothesis in this study was that the rise of in-work poverty in
the Netherlands is not so much the consequence of economic and demo-
graphic developments (more self-employment, more part-time and flexible
work, the rise of low-skilled service work, more female labour market par-
ticipation, individualization, more single-parent families, and so on), but
of institutional reforms in the Dutch welfare state (more selective access
to social security, reduction of the duration and levels of social benefits,
activating labour market policies and more obligations to work). However,
in our statistical analysis, we had no possibility of directly linking the level
of in-work poverty in the Netherlands to these changes in the Dutch
welfare state. Instead, we examined changes in the composition of the in-
work poverty population in terms of both their labour market characteris-
tics and their individual and household characteristics.
As far as labour market characteristics are concerned, we examined the
employment status, the number of working hours and the occupational
class of the working poor. We found that all these factors are significantly
related to a person’s odds of in-work poverty. Self-employed persons,
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people working in small part-time jobs (less than 20 hours a week) and
people working in skilled and unskilled Fordist or post-industrial occupa-
tions (note: not only low-skilled service jobs!) have significantly higher odds
of in-work poverty than employees, people working more than 20 hours a
week and people working in higher Fordist or post-industrial occupations.
However, we argued that the increase in in-work poverty in the Netherlands
since the mid-1990s cannot be attributed to changes in these labour market
characteristics. The in-work poverty risks for self-employed persons, part-
time workers and workers in low-skilled Fordist and post-industrial jobs
have not increased over the years (since the early 1990s). Increases in self-
employment, part-time work and the number of low-qualified service jobs
may have resulted in a rising number of low-paid workers but, as we have
argued, having an (individual) low income is not necessarily related to
poverty measured at the household level. People with low-paid work who
live in households with other income earners and pool their income with
that of a spouse are generally not poor.
We also examined various individual and household characteristics
(gender, household composition, the number of income earners in the
household, and educational levels) of the working poor. A remarkable
outcome is that gender as such does not explain a person’s odds of in-work
poverty. Although in-work poverty in the Netherlands – in contrast to
other countries – appears at first to be a predominantly female pheno-
menon (during the 1990s, at least 60 per cent of the working poor were
female), gender as such does not make a difference. Taking all other
factors into account (part-time work, working in low-skilled service
work, educational level, household composition and number of incomes in
the household) there were no gender differences in the odds of in-work
poverty.
All the other individual and household characteristics covered in the
analysis do make a difference, however. The odds of in-work poverty
among single parents are almost twice as high as the odds of couples with
children. The odds of in-work poverty for households with two or more
income earners are less than 10 per cent compared with the in-work poverty
risk of households with only one income earner. In-work poverty also
turned out to be related to educational qualifications: low-skilled working
individuals have a much higher in-work poverty risk than working people
with more human capital. Moreover, we saw that the in-work poverty risks
of single parents, one-earner households and low-skilled working individ-
uals increased during the 1990s. In other words, the point is not that there
were more single parents, single-earner households and low-skilled workers
during the 1990s, but that belonging to one or more of these categories
resulted in an increasing risk of in-work poverty.
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Behind these statistical categories, there are both new and traditional
groups who are at risk with regard to in-work poverty: on the one hand,
there are single parents who face the difficult combination of having to
provide an income and taking care of the children alone and, on the other
hand, there is the traditional male breadwinner who has to maintain a
whole family with one single income. For both at-risk groups, however, it is
first and foremost the case that low-educated individuals have a high
poverty risk. Well-educated single parents or single breadwinners generally
have sufficient human capital to avoid financial poverty (for single parents
in the Netherlands this is documented by Hooghiemstra and Knijn, 1997).
Low-qualified or unskilled single parents or single breadwinners – many of
whom come from immigrant backgrounds – are especially unable to earn
labour incomes that are sufficient to keep themselves out of poverty.
Finally, we assumed that the increased in-work poverty risks of these vul-
nerable social categories (single parents and other single earners, workers
with health limitations and/or limited human capital) are related to the
institutional changes in the Dutch social security and social assistance
systems we described earlier in this chapter. Up until the early 1990s, these
groups with limited chances in the labour market had more or less been
given up on. It was generally accepted that these groups have few possibil-
ities on the labour market and would therefore depend on social benefits
indefinitely. However, this changed during the 1990s when new social poli-
cies emphasizing activation and labour market participation were put in
place. As a result of successive social security reforms, vulnerable social cat-
egories were pushed into the labour market and urged to earn their own
incomes. However, as our study makes clear, labour market participation
does not always imply an escape from financial poverty.
NOTES
1. Esping-Andersen (1996: 265), for instance, states that ‘the alignment of political forces
conspire just about everywhere to maintain the existing principles of the welfare state’.
2. We do not use the 1984 data because in this year income data were collected in the April
survey while in all other years (in the period 1985–89) the household income was mea-
sured in the October survey. Because this may have distorted the information (periodi-
cal increase of wages, seasonal unemployment), we excluded the 1984 wave from our
analysis.
3. The disposable household income refers to summed up income of all household
members minus income transfers (such as paid alimony), income tax, expenses for
income insurances, and so on. To make it more complex, there was another significant
change in the method of income measurement in 1990. Until then, DSEP asked for the
net monthly household income. Starting 1990, DSEP asked for the gross annual house-
hold income. In all years, this figure was converted into a (net) disposable household
income by substracting paid taxes et cetera.
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4. The outcomes in Figure 5.1 differ considerably from other research findings about
income poverty in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s. Other studies usually find that
income poverty in the Netherlands was much higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s (cf.
Engbersen et al., 2000; SCP/CBS, 2005; Vrooman and Hoff, 2004). There are two expla-
nations for the differences in outcomes. (1) The population examined in the analysis: this
analysis is not about all Dutch households or individuals, but only about individuals of
working age. (2) The definition of poverty: Dutch poverty research usually uses poverty
measures that are more stable over the years. The relative poverty measure used here (60
per cent of the annual median income) tends to be less stable, especially in times of eco-
nomic growth. When household incomes increase, so does the poverty threshold and thus
the number of individuals or households below the poverty line. We have nevertheless
used a relative poverty threshold in this analysis in order to make our outcomes compa-
rable with the outcomes in other chapters of this book.
5. In official Dutch statistics, only persons who work at least 12 hours a week are counted
as workers.
6. Unlike in Esping-Andersen’s classification, we have also included sales personnel in
shops and on markets in the category of ‘Fordist low occupations’. In classifying the
occupations of the DSEP respondents in terms of Esping-Andersen’s classification of
occupational categories, we gratefully made use of a classification scheme drawn up by
Professor Robert Kloosterman (University of Amsterdam). To our knowledge, this
classification scheme has not been published. The authors thank their Amsterdam col-
league Professor Kloosterman for allowing us to make use of his work.
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Table 5.A1 Number of working people, employment and unemployment
rates in the Netherlands (1985–2001)
Employed Employment rate* Unemployed Unemployment rate
persons
Overall Males Females persons** Overall Males Females(1000s)
(1000s)
1985 4811 49 67 30 – – – –
1986 5040 – – – – – – –
1987 5257 52 70 35 – – – –
1988 5378 53 70 36 453 7.7 7.4 8.3
1989 5477 54 70 37 407 6.9 6.4 7.8
1990 5644 55 71 39 358 5.9 5.4 6.8
1991 5790 56 72 41 334 5.4 4.9 6.3
1992 5885 57 72 41 336 5.3 4.9 6.1
1993 5925 57 71 42 415 6.5 6.0 7.3
1994 5920 57 70 42 486 7.5 7.0 8.3
1995 6063 58 72 44 464 7.0 6.4 8.1
1996 6185 59 72 45 440 6.6 5.8 7.8
1997 6384 60 74 47 375 5.5 4.8 6.5
1998 6587 62 75 49 287 4.1 3.7 4.8
1999 6768 63 76 51 221 3.1 2.7 3.7
2000 6917 64 77 52 188 2.6 2.3 3.1
2001 7062 65 77 54 146 2.0 1.8 2.3
Notes:
* Employment rate: working persons (at least 12 hours a week) as a percentage of the
total population of working age (15–65 years).
** Unemployed persons: registered as job seekers and available at least 12 hours a week.
Source: Netherlands statistics (statline).
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Table 5.A2 Working and non-working poor in the Netherlands
(1985–2001)
Poor as % of total Share of poverty Poverty risk %
population in working age population %
Working Non- All Working Non- Working Non-
poor working Poor poor working poor working
poor poor poor
1985 2.1 2.7 4.8 43.3 56.7 3.5 6.7
1986 2.0 2.9 4.9 41.0 59.0 3.2 7.5
1987 2.3 3.2 5.6 42.0 58.0 3.8 8.5
1988 2.2 2.7 4.9 44.4 55.6 3.4 7.6
1989 2.3 3.0 5.3 43.3 56.7 3.5 8.5
1990 4.3 4.1 8.4 51.6 48.4 6.6 11.9
1991 4.7 5.6 10.3 45.7 54.3 7.0 17.2
1992 4.0 4.8 8.7 45.3 54.7 5.7 15.4
1993 4.0 5.0 9.0 44.7 55.3 5.8 16.3
1994 4.6 6.0 10.6 43.6 56.4 6.7 19.5
1995 3.9 5.4 9.3 42.3 57.7 5.6 18.4
1996 4.8 5.6 10.4 46.0 54.0 6.6 20.5
1997 4.6 5.1 9.7 47.7 52.3 6.2 19.3
1998 5.4 4.9 10.3 52.6 47.4 7.3 19.4
1999 5.3 5.1 10.4 51.3 48.7 7.0 21.0
2000 5.8 4.7 10.5 55.2 44.8 7.5 20.9
2001 6.0 4.6 10.6 56.8 43.2 7.7 20.9
Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
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Table 5.A3 Mean and median equivalized disposable household incomes
(in Dutch guilders) and % of poor households in the
Netherlands (1985–2001)
Year Reference period Mean Median 60% of Poverty
median rate %
1985 Monthly income in 1985 22 057 19 598 11 759 4.8
1986 Monthly income in 1986 22 655 20 183 12 110 4.9
1987 Monthly income in 1987 23 213 20 795 12 477 5.6
1988 Monthly income in 1988 24 085 21 530 12 918 4.9
1989 Monthly income in 1989 25 052 22 507 13 504 5.3
1990 Annual income in 1989 24 180 21 993 13 196 8.4
1991 Annual income in 1990 26 838 24 567 14 740 10.3
1992 Annual income in 1991 27 321 25 208 15 125 8.7
1993 Annual income in 1992 27 684 25 585 15 351 9.0
1994 Annual income in 1993 30 279 27 687 16 612 10.6
1995 Annual income in 1994 28 950 26 773 16 064 9.3
1996 Annual income in 1995 30 652 28 137 16 882 10.4
1997 Annual income in 1996 31 799 29 635 17 781 9.7
1998 Annual income in 1997 32 631 30 782 18 469 10.3
1999 Annual income in 1998 34 169 32 204 19 322 10.4
2000 Annual income in 1999 35 203 33 038 19 823 10.5
2001 Annual income in 2000 37 078 34 674 20 804 10.6
Note: Persons 15–65 years of age not including students.
Source: Dutch Socio-Economic Panel Survey 1985–2001; own computations.
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